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Although girls are approximately half the youth 
population in developing countries, they contribute 
less than their potential to the economy. The objective 
of this paper is to quantify the opportunity cost of 
girls’ exclusion from productive employment with 
the hope that stark figures will lead policymakers to 
reconsider the current underinvestment in girls. The 
paper explores the linkages between investing in girls 
and potential increases in national income by examining 
three widely prevalent aspects of adolescent girls’ lives: 
early school dropout, teenage pregnancy and joblessness. 
The countries included in the analysis are: Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Burundi, China, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. The authors use secondary data to allow 
for some comparability across countries. They find 
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that investing in girls so that they would complete the 
next level of education would lead to lifetime earnings 
of today’s cohort of girls that is equivalent to up to 
68 percent of annual gross domestic product. When 
adjusting for ability bias and labor demand elasticities, 
this figure falls to 54 percent, or 1.5 percent per year. 
Closing the inactivity rate between girls and boys would 
increase gross domestic product by up to 5.4 percent, 
but when accounting for students, male-female wage 
gaps and labor demand elasticities, the joblessness gap 
between girls and their male counterparts yields an 
increase in gross domestic product of up to 1.2 percent in 
a single year. The cost of adolescent pregnancy as a share 
of gross domestic could be as high as 30 percent or as 
low as 1 percent over a girl’s lifetime, depending on the 
assumptions used to calculate the losses. Measuring the Economic Gain of Investing in 
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1.  Introduction 
Improving the socio-economic outcomes for girls and young women is of central 
importance, not only to the beneficiaries themselves, but also to their communities and 
the next generation. Many of the 600 million girls who live in the developing world do 
not have the opportunity to become fully functioning members of society. Approximately 
one-quarter of  girls  in  developing countries  are not  in  school  (Lloyd 2005)
 and one-
quarter to one-half of girls in developing counties become mothers before age 18 (United 
Nations Population Fund 2005).  
Although  girls  are  half  the  youth  population  (aged  15-24)  of  the  developing 
world, little attention has been given to the specific challenges facing adolescent girls as 
they  develop  into  adult  members  of  families,  the  workforce,  and  society.  General 
statistics and sector-specific studies point to the merits of investing in girls, including 
lower infant mortality, healthier families (Bicego and Boerma 1993), and greater labor 
market earnings, but policy often does not explicitly target development opportunities for 
adolescent  girls.    This  may  be  due  to  insufficient  understanding  of  the  actual  social 
benefits of investing in adolescent girls.   
Most work that considers girls’ contribution to economic development or poverty 
reduction focuses on investments in girls’ education and health (see for instance Levine 
et al. 2008, Lloyd and Young 2009, Temin and Levine 2009). Returns to girls’ education 
in developing countries are substantial, and in most cases they exceed those observed in 
developed countries and those of boys. A cross country study on the effect of education 
on average wages (a proxy for productivity) estimates that primary education increases 
girls’ earnings by 5 to 15 percent over their lifetimes, while boys experience a rate of 
return between 4 and 8 percent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002).
4  And, for example, 
returns to female secondary education are 15 to 25 percent higher for women than men in 
Thailand, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (Schultz 2002).   
More  than  14  million  girls  ages  15-19  give  birth  every  year  (United  Nations 
Population  Fund  2005),  which  puts  them  at  risk.  While  there  is  an  overall  trend  of 
decreasing birth rates for girls, maternal causes kill more 15- to 19-year old girls than any 
                                                 
4 This is partly due to greater entry to formal labor markets by educated girls, where earnings exceed 
informal or home-based work (Malhotra, Grown, and Pande 2003).     3 
other cause (Patton, et al. 2009). The majority of these adolescent pregnancies take place 
within the context of early marriage (UNICEF 2001). Delaying pregnancies to a more 
healthy age is not only desirable from a general reproductive health perspective, but it 
may also lead to more economic and social empowerment of young women who can 
continue their education or secure a more lucrative job.  To the best of our knowledge, 
there  has  not  been  systematic  research  to  measure  the  opportunity  cost  of  teenage 
motherhood to economic growth. 
Recent  work  has  begun  to  quantify  the  potential  that  human  development 
investments in girls have on GDP growth rates.  Hanushek and Woessmann (2007), using 
cross-sectional  regressions  for  50  countries,  estimate  that  each  additional  year  of 
schooling boosts long-run growth by 0.58 percentage points per year. A World Bank 
study in 1999 demonstrates through data simulation for a selection of 100 countries, that 
increasing the secondary education of girls by 1% results in annual income increase of 
0.3% per capita. Such an increase is substantial for many developing countries. The study 
concludes that ―societies that have a preference for not investing in girls pay a price for it 
in terms of slower growth and reduced income‖ (Dollar and Gatti 1999).  
Recent  empirical  work conducted by the World  Bank on  Latin American and 
Caribbean countries has broadened this work to consider the importance of a range of 
youth behaviors on GDP growth.  These studies use non-parametric methodologies to 
quantify the individual and social costs related to risky youth behavior, which includes 
among  others  unemployment,  early  school  leaving  and  adolescent  pregnancy 
(Cunningham  et  al.  2008,  World  Bank  2003,  2007).  Evidence  from  Latin  America 
estimates the social cost due to these youth problems equal to 2 percent of GDP annually 
(Cunningham et al. 2008). 
In  this  paper,  we  aim  to  expand  the  above  findings  on  the  linkages  between 
investing in girls and potential increases in national income by broadening the scope of 
the analysis to include several aspects of adolescent girls’ lives in countries across the 
world. These include early school dropout, teenage pregnancy, and joblessness, defined 
as the ratio of the number of girls between the age of 15 and 24 who are not in school or 
in the labor force as a share of the female working age population aged 15-24. Although 
these issues have been extensively discussed by social development specialists (Levine et   4 
al. 2009), there has been no evaluation to date of the economic costs imposed on societies 
by the extensive incidence of these negative factors. Such an exercise is important in 
demonstrating  the  potential  magnitude  of  economic  gains  to  nations  as  a  result  of 
investing in adolescent girls and ensuring they are on a path to achieve their maximum 
human potential. 
This  paper  focuses  on  girls  rather  than  women  or  boys.    Adolescence  is  the 
critical period when girls are at a greater risk of many events with irreversible negative 
consequences – such as child marriage, early pregnancy, or school leaving – that not only 
impact girls themselves but also the next generation.  Girls face specific adversities that 
make them even more vulnerable than women or than boys.  For example household and 
community-wide perceptions that girls have limited economic value, compared to boys, 
can result in reduced family desire to keep their daughters in school. Given this, the 
recommendations presented in this paper highlight actions that countries can take to reap 
the benefit of investing in their girls. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual 
framework and empirical methodology of the paper; Sections 3 through 5 report the cost 
estimate results for a selection of developing countries and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework and empirical methodology 
This  paper  builds  on  the  methodology  developed  in  World  Bank  (2003)  to 
generate the economic costs of girls’ and young women’s exclusion in terms of early 
school  dropout,  joblessness,  and  pregnancy.
5  The  cost  estimates  measure  the 
consequences of the depletion of human capital, as young girls who do not develop their 
potential,  or  whose  human capi tal  is  constrained,  necessarily  limit  their productive 
contribution to the economy. The empirical exercise seeks to quantify the opportunity 
costs related to this lost productivity. We do not include the losses associated with other 
aspects of growth such  as fewer sick days (Grossman and Kaestner 1997) of more 
educated workers or lower violence rates  among  children of adult (rather than teen) 
                                                 
5 The definition of youth depends on the sectoral and cultural context under study; for the purposes of this 
study youth female or girls, as per the United Nations definition, refer to females in the age bracket of 15 to 
24. All cost data refer to girls in this age range with the exception of adolescent pregnancy, which refers to 
girls ages 15 to 19.   5 
mothers (Donohue and Levitt 2001).  Also, we do not include the many non-economic 
factors associated with underinvestment in girls, such as emotional distress from a young 
girls’ violent death, lower health status due to low educational attainment, or losses of 
cultural assets due to early childbearing-related deaths, due to difficulty in quantifying 
these costs. 
We only estimate the opportunity (economic) cost and do not consider financial 
costs.  The opportunity cost is a measure of ―what could have been‖ if only the additional 
investment  had  been  made  in  girls.    The  financial  costs  of  under-investing  in  girls’ 
development such as greater health expenditures for teen mothers or payment of higher 
social  benefits  to  women  who  did  not  complete  school  are  not  included  since  these 
resources exist in the economy and would be redistributed to other uses if not spent on 
adolescent girls.  We do not estimate the value of the alternative use of these resources 
for two reasons.  First, the modeling requirements are quite difficult and the necessary 
data are scarce.
6  Second, these factors are difficult to quantify in a cross -country setup, 
as countries differ greatly in their economic and institutional structures.  The estimates in 
this paper take into account the primary impacts of girls’ restricted human development 
and do not incorporate the secondary and intergenerational impacts. 
Countries selected for analysis in this paper represent a sample composed on the basis 
of three considerations.  First, they must be developing countries for which sufficient data 
exist to enable the calculations and estimates to be performed within the timeframe of 
publishing  this  study.    Second,  they  must  have  indicators  implying  significant 
vulnerabilities  for  adolescent  girls  or  validating  existing  conditions  exacerbating 
adolescent girls’ social exclusion (e.g., low school enrollment rates, high rates of early 
marriage, high prevalence of HIV, gender based violence, or a population distribution 
skewed toward males thereby suggesting a lower value for girl-children in that society).  
Third, they must be known to have programs and interventions that are designed to reach 
vulnerable adolescent girls at risk of early school dropout or adolescent pregnancy and 
offer them a means of increasing their economic empowerment. Or, they are countries 
where the institutions are such that these programs would be feasible.  We over-sample 
                                                 
6 For example, Assunção and Carvalho (2005) estimate the financial costs to under-investment in youth in 
Brazil.  Even in a middle-income country with relatively good data collection, the authors were unable to 
capture the majority of the financial costs necessary to estimate a meaningful value.     6 
African countries, including all those that the data will permit, but we also attempt to 
include a few countries from other parts of the developing world.  The resulting countries 
for analysis are: Bangladesh, Brazil, Burundi, China, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
7   We also carry out the 
estimates for the United States, United Kingdom,   Norway,  and Sweden to allow for 
developed country comparisons. 
To allow for cross-country comparisons in the estimates, we use secondary data from 
sources that use a common methodology to generate their numbers based on each 
country’s primary data.  The country-specific data essential for the cost estimation is 
drawn from official sources including the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Key 
Indicators  of  the  Labor  Market  (KILM);  the  World  Bank  statistics  from  the  World 
Development  Indicators  (WDI),  HNPStats  and  EDStats;  and  the  World  Health 
Organization’s Global Health Observatory database. In some cases, we used statistics that 
were generated differently by country; these are indicated in the methodology discussion 
below.   
 
a. Methodology for computing the cost of leaving school early 
Measuring the loss in potential earnings due to lower educational attainment is 
done in two steps, in a methodology similar to World Bank (2003) and Chaaban (2007). 
First, an age earnings profile is created by gender and education level.  To calculate the 
wage  for  each  cell,  we  adjust  the  mean  national  wage  for  a  given  country  using 
coefficient estimates from latest national Mincer regressions to evaluate the variation of 
wages according to education, age and gender.  
Second, we sum the total lifetime earnings of having a certain level of educational 
attainment and subtract from it the total lifetime earnings of having a lower level of 
education. This gives us the net gain that a country would theoretically enjoy if that girl 
finished the next level of education.  This is done for all children and also disaggregated 
for males and females.  
The equation used to generate the foregone earnings of having a higher degree is 
the following: 
                                                 
7 Due to data limitations, we are not able to include all these countries in every estimation.     7 
  
      
  
  
         
 
 
    
  
 





s is the total lifetime earnings differential for an individual i with education level 
s who dropped out before achieving a higher educational level s’ = s+1 for s=0, 1, 2 
where s=0 corresponds to incomplete primary school, s=1 corresponds to primary school 
completed  only,  s=2  corresponds  to  secondary  school  completed  only,  and  s’=3 
corresponds to tertiary education; e are the annual earnings at time t of an individual with 
s (or s’) educational level, t is the age at which this individual begins work and T is the 
age at which this individual will retire; and r is the discount rate.  For simplicity, we 
assume that T-t for those with a level of education s is equivalent to T-t for those with s’ 
level of education.  Finally, to calculate the total lifetime loss in earnings for all girls who 
were not in school in the observation year, we multiply Ei
s by the number of students in 
the population who did not go on to continue their education (Es). We repeat this exercise 
for each s and sum together to generate the total foregone earnings of the most recent 
cohort of school leavers (E): 
       
 
   
 
As in Cunningham et al. (2008), we use 45 years as the length of the working life, and a 6 
percent discount rate.  
Assuming that if girls had just completed the next level of education, they would 
earn the same average wage as those who actually did complete that level of education 
would over-estimate the productivity gains to education since part of that gap is likely 
due to a difference in abilities that cannot be attributed to differential education levels.
8  
To account for ability bias, we  introduce an adjustment to average wages.  We use two 
adjustment factors.  First, based on Card (1999), we assume that girls with only s level of 
education, if they completed s+1 years of education, they would earn wages that are 10% 
                                                 
8 Numerous studies have shown that those who complete s level of education are less ―able‖ than those who 
complete s+1 level of education due to genetic or social factors that are unobservable to the researcher, but 
observed and acted upon by the girl, her parents, the school, or others (Card 1999).  Thus, we cannot 
assume that if a girl only had completed one additional level of education, she would be earning the 
average wage equivalent to the observed wages of girls who actually did complete that level of education.  
Instead, we need to account for ability bias when assigning average wages of girls with s+1  level of 
education to girls with only s level of education.      8 
less than the average wage for s+1 graduates at each age throughout their work lives.   In 
other  words,  when  calculating  the  difference  between  wages  of  girls  with  s  level  of 
education and those with s+1 level of education, we adjust downward by 10% the s+1 
wages.  Second, based on scarcer research from developing countries, we assume that the 
less educated girls, when gaining an additional level of education, would earn 20% less 
than the currently observed average wage for girls with s+1 level of education.    
We make yet another adjustment to account for the possibility that the influx of 
more educated girls into the labor force will reduce the equilibrium wage for that skills-
segment  of  the  labor  market.    Following  on  Behar  (2004),  we  use  labor  demand 
elasticities of -0.56 to -0.8 for sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, for each 1% increase in the 
share of the labor force with a higher level of education, we decrease the average wage 
by 0.56% and 0.8%. For countries in Asia, we draw on Goldar (2008) and apply an 
elasticity  of  -0.4.  In  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  the  elasticity  is  -0.2,  as  in 
Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005). 
  The data come from various sources.  The returns to education that are estimated 
in Mincer equations are drawn from country studies.  The average wage is taken from the 
ILO’s KILM database.  The number of girls dropping out of each grade level is from the 
World Bank’s EDStats.   
To allow for some degree of comparison across countries, we state the final cost 
as  a  share  of  the  country’s  most  recent  GDP.    This  also  allows  us  to  generate  all 
calculations in local currency but still have comparability ex-post.  It adjusts for the size 
of  the  economy  and,  to  some  degree  population,  allowing  for  a  better  sense  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  gain  in  the  context  of  the  country’s  output.    Finally,  it  better 
communicates the implications for economic growth than a raw currency amount would. 
The value of annual GDP is taken from the World Bank’s WDI. 
 
b. Methodology for computing the cost of inactivity and joblessness  
Following Cunningham and García-Verdú (forthcoming) and Chaaban (2007), the 
estimate captures the opportunity cost of girls’ inactivity and joblessness in regard to lost 
wages and productivity.  The ―inactivity rate‖ is the share of girls age 15-24 who are not 
working; this includes girls who are both in school and out of school.  We consider two   9 
target scenarios: girls have the same inactivity rate as adult women (Target 1) and girls 
have  the  same  inactivity  rate  as  boys  (Target  2).The  following  equation  is  used  to 
calculate the cost as foregone output to the economy: 
                                 
 
where IRy is young girls’ inactivity rate; IR
* is the target inactivity rate; WAPy is the 
working age population of young females; and wy is real annual female youth wage. The 
opportunity  cost  scenario  is  where  girls’  inactivity  rates  are  the  same  as  that  of  a 
counterfactual  group,  where  IR*  is  the  counterfactual  rate.  Thus,  (IRy  –  IR*)xWAPy 
gives us the number of additional girls who would be working if girls’ inactivity rates 
were the same as IR*.  Since most girls are not searching for jobs, we assume that the lost 
productivity per year is equivalent to the annual wage of all those girls who ―could‖ be 
working.  Cost is then divided by total GDP in order to obtain an estimate of the cost of 
youth inactivity for males and females as a share of GDP. 
Data for the number of female youth labor force participants is drawn from the 
ILO’s  KILM  database,  which  projects  employment  data  based  on  country-specific 
models. GDP is drawn in current US dollars from the WDI database (World Bank). As 
there are no cross-country comparable wage data for youth, the methodology relies on 
using the GDP per labor force participant (PPP adjusted). The computation assumes that 
the share of wage earnings is 60% of GDP.
 9   Since females earn less than males and this 
ratio differs widely across countries, we introduce three adjustment factors to simulate 
the gender wage gap:  25%, 50%, and 75% of average wages (based on Saba Arbache, 
Kolev, and Filipiak, 2010).  Further, since youth earn less than adults, we introduce three 
adjustment factors to the average wage to account for the age wage gap: 50%, 70%, and 
90% of average earnings.
10 
The ILO’s KILM ―inactivity‖ rates that we use in the above estimates include 
students,  which  would  lead  to  an  over-estimate  of  the  joblessness  issue.    A  more 
appropriate estimate would be to generate the foregone output only of those girls who are 
                                                 
9 These assumptions are based on cross-country estimates elaborated in Cunningham, and García-Verdú, 
(forthcoming). 
10 The 70% adjustment factor is based on a comparison of mean youth and adult wages in several Latin 
American countries (Cunningham et al., 2008).   10 
not working or studying; i.e. the ―jobless‖.  We can define the ―jobless rate‖ as the share 
of girls age 15-24 who are unemployed, not working in labor market activities, and not in 
school.  Thus, the difference between the inactivity rate and the jobless rate is that the 
former includes students while the latter excludes students.   
Unfortunately, no data source provides ―joblessness‖ rates so we estimate them 
for the purposes of this paper.  To purge students from the ILO’s KILM inactivity rate, 
we use EDStats secondary school attendance rates to roughly estimate the percentage of 
girls 15-24 who are in school.
11   We generate two joblessness rates, under different 
assumptions.  First, we assume that girls age 15 and older are only  in upper secondary.  
We use gross upper secondary school enrollment rates to calculate the number of girls 
aged  15-24  who are in secondar y school and divide by the number by the female 
population age 15-24. We call this the  ―lower bound‖ because it does not account for 
girls  over  age  15  who  are  delayed  in  school  (i.e.,  in  primary  or  lower  secondary).  
Second, we assume that all girls in upper secondary are 15 and older and that half of the 
girls  in  lower  secondary  are  over  age  15.  We  divide  this  number  by  the  female 
population,  age  15-24  to  estimate  an  ―upper  bound‖  since  we  are  likely  to  be 
overestimating  the  number  of  girls  in  lower  secondary  who  are  over-age.  We  then 
subtract the lower bound and the upper bound from the KILM activity rate to get two 
measures for girls’ joblessness rates.
12 
We present the opportunity cost both of girls’ inactivity and of girls’ joblessness 
relative to women’s and boys’ inactivity and joblessness.  We use the more precisely 
measured but less conceptually correct inactivity rate as our base case.  Then we present 
– and compare – the costs when using the less precisely measured but more conceptually 
correct jobless rates. 
 
As  in  our  calculations  for  early  school  leaving,  we  adjust  for  labor  demand 
elasticities, assuming that an increase in the number of workers will decrease  market 
wages. In this case, we apply the same elasticities described in the last section.  
                                                 
11 The age range 15-24 was chosen due to data availability. Ideally, girls aged 15 should be still pursuing 
their studies and not working. 
12 It should be noted that females might engage in valuable home-based production activities, and this is not 
corrected by the ILO’s inactivity rates.   11 
It should be noted that the costs only refer to economic opportunity costs related 
to loss of productivity, and do not capture costs related to emotional distress, risky health 
behavior and other factors that come with being jobless.  These costs are an annual cost, 
rather  than  a  lifetime  cost,  as  estimated  for  early  school  leaving  and  adolescent 
pregnancy. 
 
c. Methodology for computing the costs of adolescent pregnancy  
Adolescent  pregnancy  may  affect  future  earnings  through  various  channels.  
Maynard (1996) argues that adolescent pregnancy in the United States reduces young 
mothers’ future productivity and earnings through higher school dropouts (among other 
factors).  More recent work on US women’s earnings by Anderson, Binder, and Krause 
(2003) identifies a ―motherhood tax‖ that results from less job experience of mothers due 
to time out of work to attend to childbearing and childrearing responsibilities.  Neither of 
these factors is likely to be as important in developing countries as in the US partly due to 
early school leaving (unrelated to pregnancy) in many low-skilled countries, fewer safety 
nets that allow for women to not work for a period, and less structured labor markets (i.e. 
self-employment) that do not require consistency in job attendance, but they may have 
some impact.  Following World Bank (2003) and Chaaban (2007), we compute the costs 
linked to adolescent pregnancies as measured through forgone lifetime earnings due to 
early pregnancies.  
We  estimate  the  opportunity  cost  of  adolescent  pregnancy  using  two 
methodologies, each subscribing to specific transmission mechanisms.  First, based on 
the observation that teen mothers have lower levels of education than girls who delay 
pregnancy (McCauley and Salter 1995), we compute the opportunity cost by measuring 
the adolescent mother’s foregone annual income due to fewer years of schooling. We 
assume that if girls had postponed their first birth, they would earn a greater wage at 
every age throughout their working lives than those girls who did not postpone.   
We assume a constant wage gap over their working lives between young mothers 
and girls who postponed their childbearing.  Implicitly, we assume that the slope of the 
age-earnings  profile  is  the  same  across  groups  but  the  intercept  differs  by  the  wage   12 
premium gained by greater levels of education of girls who postponed childbirth.
13  Since 
wages are not reported separately for adolescent mothers and non -mothers, we use the 
average adult female expected wage as an ear nings proxy for a girl who postponed 
childbirth  and  the  average  female  youth  expected  wage  as  an  earnings  proxy  for 
adolescent mothers. Then the difference between average female wage and t he average 
teenage mother wage is a proxy for the ―cost‖ of early childbearing to lifetime economic 
productivity:
14 
                                       
 
where I is forgone annual earnings; wF is mean annual adult female wage;  EmpF is adult 
female  employment  rate; wYf  is  mean  annual  youth  female wage and  EmpYf is  youth 
female employment rate.  
The above costs correspond to the average costs of early pregnancy for one girl in 
one year. To measure the total cohort cost per year, we multiply the average cost with the 
number of adolescent births in the observation year (Yf). Assuming these girls will stop 
working when they are age 60 and these young mothers are age 15—the International 
Labor Organization’s standard age for the beginning of a work life—when they enter the 
labor market, we multiply the annual cost of the cohort by the years that the cohort will 
be working, which is 45 (retirement age minus age of first working).  Finally, as above, 
we state the total country costs as a share of current year GDP. 
Several sources of data are used.  The wage data are those that were derived for 
the estimates of early school leaving, reported in section a, above.  The World Bank’s 
HNPStats was used for incidence of adolescent childbirth, and the World Bank’s WDI 
database was used for GDP values. 
While  the  observed  wage  gap  between  teen  mothers  and  other  girls  persists 
throughout life, this may be more a factor of differences in innate ability rather than a 
                                                 
13 Ideally, we would have replicated the age earnings profiles discussed above in the ―education‖ section 
and applied the methodology to this section.  Unfortunately, our data only allow us to measure earnings by 
grade level.  Since adolescent mothers and non-mothers often differ in education level by only a few years, 
―grade level‖ is not sufficiently disaggregated to identify wage differences across groups.  Our thanks to 
one of our referees for the recommendation to explore this methodological approach. 
14 We could control for the labor market dynamic for females, however this  varies substantially across 
countries and would make cross-country comparisons difficult to interpret.  Instead, we choose to use  a 
constant change factor and provide comparative statics across countries.    13 
result of early childbearing.  To account for this, we use Anderson, et. al. (2003) to adjust 
for a ―motherhood tax,‖ which reduces lifetime wages by 5% (for those with one child) 
and 10% (for those with two children). This is done primarily for discussion purposes as 
it draws upon research done in the United States and thus has conclusions that would not 
apply in a developing country. 
Again, it should be noted that these costs are underestimates of the true social 
costs of adolescent  pregnancy since they only  measure the losses  attributed to  lower 
productivity due to truncated human capital accumulation.  The many other implications 
of early motherhood are summarized in various sources (World Bank 2007, Cunningham 
et. al. 2008b). 
 
3.  Out of school: The  cost of cutting her education short 
Among the developing countries in our study, India and China have the lowest 
dropout rates in both primary and secondary levels, with only 1% of girls not completing 
primary school and 6% and 25%, respectively, not completing secondary school (Figure 
1).   Tanzania and Senegal tell a different story, though, with less than 60% of girls 
completing primary education.  Low secondary completion rates are also observed in the 
African countries in the sample, with less than 20% of girls in the age range of 15 to 24 
completing their secondary education in Burundi, Ethiopia, Senegal,  and Uganda, for 
example. Secondary dropout rates are higher than primary dropout rates in all countries. 
School dropout rates for girls are higher than those for boys in most developing countries, 
partly due to reasons outside the girl’s control, such as early marriage or cultural norms 
that prioritize investments in boys (Levine et al. 2009). 
The  lifetime  ―costs‖  of  female  school  dropouts,  that  can  be  attributed  to  lost 
productive capacity due to under-investment in girls’ education, range from nearly 70% 
of annual GDP in Burundi to a barely noticeable 0.5% of annual GDP in India and China, 
figures that are comparable to the developed countries in our sample.  The last set of bars 
in Figure 2 shows the costs to Burundi.  If primary school dropouts – equal to 27 percent 
of girls – had just completed primary school before going to work, they would have 
generated lifetime income equivalent to nearly 25% of Burundi’s annual GDP. And if the 
88 percent of girls who were not able to complete secondary school had just been able to   14 
do so, their additional lifetime productivity would increase Burundi’s GDP by an amount 
more than 2/3 of their annual GDP.  Thus, if each Burundian girl completed the next level 
of education, the total contribution to productivity over her lifetime could be equivalent 
to nearly one year of Burundi’s GDP, or GDP growth rates would be 2 percentage points 
higher per year over the next 45 years – the working lifetime of today’s girls. 
Other African countries in the sample also show significant opportunity cost due 
to girls’ school dropout.  If girls in Kenya, Tanzania, Senegal and Uganda had completed 
primary school alone, their additional output over their lifetimes would be equivalent to 
20%, 18%, 14%, and 13% of annual GDP, respectively.  And if their more educated 
sisters completed secondary school, they would contribute 48%, 32%, 24%, and 34% (of 
annual GDP) more to their economies over their lifetimes, equivalent to an increase in 
annual GDP growth rates by approximately 0.5% to 1% annually for the next 45 years 
(Figure 2). 
When accounting for ability bias and depressed wages due to an influx of more 
highly educated workers, we find that in countries where the cost is large in the original 
calculations, it generally remains large in adjusted calculations. For example, in Burundi, 
applying a 10% ability bias results in a lifetime cost of secondary school dropout that is 
equivalent to 61% of annual GDP, as compared to 66% when we do not account for 
ability bias. In Kenya, applying the most upper-bound measures (a 20% ability bias and 
an -0.8 labor demand elasticity) shifts the cost of secondary school dropout from 48% to 
31%.  
It is worth noting that all but one of the permutations with a 20% ability bias 
resulted in a negative cost for primary school leaving. This is because in all countries in 
the study except Kenya, the return on primary education versus no education is less than 
20%.
15 
The opportunity cost of dropouts does not strictly map to the share of girls who 
drop out of school.  For example, while  more than 85% of secondary school-aged girls 
are not in school in Uganda and Burundi (Figure 1), the implications for Burundi (68% of 
GDP) are far higher than those of Uganda (34%) (Figure 2).  This differential is due to a 
larger economy in  Uganda and thus a lower share of girls’ productivity in total GDP 
                                                 
15 The sensitivity analysis results are available upon request, from the authors.   15 
values.  So while the total income that Uganda foregoes due to school dropout is four 
times that of Burundi, the losses measured as a share of GDP are lower in the richer 
Uganda case than in Burundi.  Or, while 40% of primary school-aged girls in Senegal do 
not complete their first level of schooling, as compared to 41% in Tanzania, the costs to 
primary school dropouts are higher in Tanzania (18%) than in Senegal (14%).  Again, 
this is due to the lower wage share of girls in the Senegalese economy relative to the 
Tanzanian economy. 
Among the Asian countries in the education sample (India and China), the cost to 
the economy of early school dropouts is negligible, at far less than 1 percent.  This is 
particularly striking in  China, where 25% of  girls  do not  complete secondary school 
(Figure 1) but the costs to the economy are barely a blip in Figure 2.  This is clearly due 
to  the  low  share  of  girl’s  wages  relative  to  the  enormous  economies  in  both  these 
countries.  Unsurprisingly, these findings hold up when we adjust for ability bias and 
labor  demand  elasticity.  We  should  not  interpret  this  finding  as  an  argument  against 
investing in girls, though.  If we consider the monetary lifetime value of the opportunity 
cost of secondary school dropout in each country – US$32 billion (PPP adjusted) for 
China  and  US$10  billion  (PPP  adjusted)  in  India  –  we  see  that  the  costs  are  quite 
substantial (Table 1).  Supporting these girls may not contribute large amounts to overall 
GDP, but it will play a significant role in poverty reduction and in secondary effects, 
which we do not measure in this paper.   
Finally,  in  the  nine  countries  under  study,  dropping  out  of  secondary  school 
causes higher costs to the economy than dropping out of primary school.  This is driven 
by two effects.  First, the share of affected girls is much higher among secondary than 
primary school-aged populations.  Second, the returns to secondary education are much 
higher than the returns to primary school. 
  It is important to note that these estimates are an underestimate of the total losses 
due to early school leaving.
16 While wages capture job productivity, they do not account 
for other costs of early school leaving suc h as higher unemployment, inferior health 
status, and greater involvement in criminal activity.  
                                                 
16 We believe that any overestimations have been addressed through the adjustments for ability bias and 
labor-skills demand elasticities.  Table 1 presents the sensitivity analysis.   16 
 
4.  Out of work: The cost of excluding her from the job market 
Up to 85% of girls in our sample countries are inactive (Figure 3).  In India, 
Nigeria and South Africa, more than three quarters of all girls 15-24 are not engaged in 
paid work and are not looking for work.
17  This compares to 61% in Paraguay, 57% in 
Brazil and 50% in Bangladesh.  At the other end of the spectrum, only  a quarter of 
Ethiopian girls report that they are inactive. 
Girls  and  women  have  similar  inactivity  rates  in  some  countries,  but  very 
different rates in others.  Girls and women in Ethiopia are close to equally inactive, with 
the difference being 7 percentage points (Figure 4).  Nigeria and South Africa are at the 
opposite extreme:  51% of Nigerian women identify themselves as inactive as compared 
to 83 percent of girls while 85% of South African girls are inactive compared to 57% of 
women.  
In all developing countries girls have higher inactivity rates than boys (Figure 5).  
The gap ranges from  36  percentage points in  India and  29 in Paraguay  to only  5 
percentage points in Ethiopia.  Regional patterns of gender disparities do not emerge: 
while India shows the largest disparity, this is followed by Paraguay and then Nigeria.   
If young women’s inactivity rates were equal to those of adult women, annual 
GDP growth rates would be up to 5.4 percentage points higher (Figure 6).  The highest 
gains are in Nigeria, where the gap between young and adult women’s inactivity rates is 
32%, the largest disparity of the countries in our sample.  This compares to a loss of 3.9% 
of annual GDP in South Africa.  So while the gap in inactivity rates is only 3 percentage 
points more in Nigeria than that in South Africa, the actual youth female population in 
Nigeria is much higher while GDP is lower than in South Africa. The result is a very 
different impact between these two countries when the cost is presented as a share of 
annual GDP.   
At the other end of the spectrum, the foregone GDP is relatively low in Ethiopia 
(Figure 6).  This is also the country in our sample with the smallest gap in inactivity rates 
                                                 
17 These figures are not adjusted for school-going girls.  These adjustments are used, and reported, in the 
estimates of the costs of early school leaving.  However, to better understand the summary statistics, it 
worth noting that approximately 20% of girls age 15-24 are still in school in India and South Africa while 
only 7% of Nigerian girls who are not working are studying.   17 
between young and adult women (Figure 4).  Although the magnitude of the loss is small 
in terms of GDP growth rates, it is large in terms of foregone earnings.  The PPP adjusted 
annual income loss is equivalent to US$646 million in Ethiopia (Table 2). 
If young women had inactivity rates similar to those of young men, annual GDP 
growth rates would be up to 4.4% higher (Figure 7).  Annual GDP growth rates in India, 
Nigeria,  and  Paraguay  would  be  4.4,  3.5,  and  3.3  percent  higher  if  girls  were  as 
economically active as boys (Figure 7).  This is equivalent to almost US$165 billion (PPP 
adjusted) in India, for example (Table 2).  In South Africa, where the gender differential 
in inactivity rates is small, the gains to greater economic activity of girls is much smaller, 
though it still exceeds US$3.7 billion. 
The gender gap does not always incur higher opportunity cost than the age gap.  
In Bangladesh, Brazil, India, and Paraguay, the gains are much larger if girls’ inactivity 
rates were more similar to those of boys than of adult women since the gap in inactivity 
rates  is  larger  between  the  sexes  (within  age)  than  the  within-sex  between-age  gaps.  
While in the African countries in the sample, if girls had the same (lower) inactivity rates 
as adult women, the economies would enjoy larger gains than if the goal were to reduce 
girls’ inactivity rates to those of boys.   
Accounting  for  the  value  of  housework  does  not  significantly  change  these 
estimates for those countries in which data are available.  Data from Brazil and India 
allow  us  to  adjust  the  opportunity  cost  of  inactivity  estimates  to  account  for  the 
productive  value  that  home-based  work  generates.  Such  adjustments  to  the  cost  of 
inactivity include a proxy for the value of home-based production activities for young 
women. However, this decrease in the cost of inactivity is not considerable. For example, 
accounting for home-based production decreases the cost of inactivity of Brazil by 14% - 
thus reducing the losses relative to women’s employment from 1.2% to 1.0% of annual 
GDP - and that of India by 19% (a reduction of the annual GDP figure from 1.6% to 
1.3%).  
Turning to ―joblessness‖ rates, where we drop students from the inactivity rate, 
the cost of female youth joblessness – relative to that of adult women – falls to zero or is 
negative  for  most  of  our  sample  (Figure  6).    In  every  country,  adjusting  the  girls’ 
inactivity rate for the lower-bound school attendance estimate results in joblessness rates   18 
among  girls  that  are  lower  than  those  of  women  and,  except  in  except  Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Rwanda generate  a negative ―cost.‖  Adjusting by the ―upper 
bound‖  creates  an  even  larger  negative  gap,  such  that  the  costs  are  only  positive  in 
Nigeria and Rwanda.   In other words, girls are less ―jobless‖ than adult women once we 
account for school-going girls.  Further, when we adjust for wages, where we assume that 
youth earn 50% of the adult wage, we find that the costs across all developing countries 
are close to half of those reported in our primary calculations.
18 
For target 2, we find that adjusting inactivity rates for the lower bound for boys 
and girls, reduces the cost as a share of annual GDP by 0.5 percentage points in Brazil, 
while it raises it by 0.5 percentage points in Nigeria  (Figure 7). At the upper bound, it 
ranges from -0.6 percentage points in Brazil to 0.7 in Nigeria and Turkey.  This accounts 
for  girls’  higher  secondary  school  educational  attendance  than  boys  in  Brazil  –  thus 
reducing the  gap in  the inactivity  rate  –  compared to boys’ higher secondary school 
attendance in Nigeria, where more boys are dropped from the inactivity rate than girls 
are, thus generating a larger gender jobless gap as compared to the gender inactivity gap.  
Adjusting separately for wages, where we assume for example that females earn 50% of 
male wages, the costs as a share of GDP range from -0.2% in Rwanda to 2% in India. 
This  compares  to  the  -0.5%  and  4.4%  estimates  in  our  original  inactivity  rate 
calculations, respectively. Putting it all together using the upper bound joblessness rates, 
accounting for a 50% male-female wage gap, and incorporating demand elasticities, we 
find that the cost of girls’ joblessness, relative to that of boys’, ranges from -0.1% in 
Rwanda to 1.2% in India.  The cost of girls’ joblessness in Nigeria, which had the highest 
inactivity rates (not adjusted for labor demand elasticities or male-female wage gaps) is 
1.0%. 
The costs of joblessness should be seen as an underestimate of the true overall 
costs  a  society  pays  due  to  high  young  women’s  exclusion  from  labor  markets. 
Joblessness  has  many  implications  that  were  not  taken  into  consideration  in  the 
calculation of the estimated costs on the country’s productivity. These costs may include 
psychological distress costs since the unemployed typically face a loss of self esteem, and 
                                                 
18 The point estimates when using different combinations of assumptions on the jobless rate, male-female 
or adult-youth wage rates, and elasticities of demand are available upon request from the authors.   19 
the  foregone  opportunity  to  acquire  human  capital  through  on-the-job  training  and 
learning (see sources cited in Cunningham et al. 2008).  Joblessness also may lead to 
other risky behaviors to earn money including risky sexual behavior, illegal trade, or 
underground activities. The costs above exclude the cumulative effects these may have. 
The costs also exclude the impacts of a continued cycle of intergenerational poverty as a 
result of girls’ failure to reach their full economic potential.  
It is important to note that the costs of joblessness seems far lower than the costs 
of school dropout, but this is largely due to the fact that we are measuring the costs of 
each behavior over different time frames.  While a typical school-leaving behavior in 
developing countries is one of gradual ―dropping out‖ over a short period, as seen by 
frequent  absenteeism,  increasing  work  (in  the  market  or  home)  and  eventual 
abandonment, the drop-out  decision is typically terminal.   Girls will  not  – and often 
cannot  –  return  to  school  later  in  their  lives  thereby  affecting  their  entire  earnings 
(productivity) path for the rest of their lives.  Thus, we measure foregone earnings over 
the  lifetime.    Conversely,  women’s  entry  to  and  exit  from  the  labor  market  is  quite 
frequent.  So the ―jobless‖ behavior is often short term and does not necessarily have 
lifetime consequences for future productivity.
19  We thus measure joblessness for the year 
that it is observed rather than aggregating across the girl’s lifetimes.    
 
5.  Girls with children: The cost of adolescent pregnancy 
Adolescent pregnancy rates are highest in the African countries in our sample but 
the total number of adolescent pregnancies is greatest in the populous India, Brazil and 
Bangladesh.  For example, for every 1,000 girls age 15-19 in Uganda and Malawi, 148 
and 133, respectively, have given birth.  This compares to 10 of every 1,000 adolescent 
girls in China, lower than the US or UK, or 67 of every 1,000 adolescent girls in India 
(Figure 8).  However, nearly four million adolescent girls give birth every year in India 
and more than half a million in Bangladesh, as compared to 367,000 in Uganda and 
Malawi combined.  China, though the most populous country, has such low adolescent 
                                                 
19 While one might argue that being out of the labor force leads to skills obsolescence and, thus, lower 
earnings later in the work life, the deterioration of skills has not been well documented and is likely to pale 
next to the actual learning, or the signaling, from completing the next level of education.   20 
pregnancy  rates  that  its  total  number  of  births  per  year  only  exceeds  the  combined 
number of births in Uganda and Malawi by 165,000. 
The lifetime opportunity cost related to adolescent pregnancy – measured by the 
young mother’s foregone annual income over her lifetime – ranges from 1 percent of 
annual GDP in China to 30 percent of annual GDP in Uganda.  Malawi and Nigeria also 
have very high costs, equal to 27%, and 26% of GDP, respectively (Figure 9).  Unlike in 
the education estimates, only China matches the United States, Sweden and Norway for 
having a small impact of adolescent pregnancy on output. Even the Indian estimates are 
12%  of  annual  GDP,  which  when  presented  in  PPP-adjusted  dollars,  equals  nearly 
US$400 billion. 
The regional differences do not break down as clearly for adolescent pregnancy as 
they did for education.  While the African countries in the sample incur the highest costs, 
as a share of GDP, up to 30% in Uganda, Bangladesh (11%) shows that Asian countries 
are  missing  out  by  not  better  supporting  their  girls  and  Latin  America  faces  similar 
challenges with the costs in Paraguay at 12%. 
The PPP-adjusted dollar costs tell a slightly different story, where the costs to 
India are the largest of the sample, followed by Brazil (Table 3).  Brazil would have 
greater productivity equal to more than US$3.5 billion if teen girls delayed pregnancy 
until their early twenties, while India’s productivity would be US$7.7 billion higher.  At 
the other extreme is Malawi, where the costs are US$57.8 million (PPP adjusted) but as a 
share of GDP the cost is 27%.  The differential reflects higher wages in Brazil – nearly 
ten times those of Malawi. Moreover, a larger population in Brazil, compared to Malawi, 
results in nearly six times the number of total adolescent births in Brazil in a single year.  
The assumptions underlying the estimates are conservative, namely that girls who 
give  birth  will  truncate  their  education  and  the  wage  gap  with  women  who  delay 
pregnancy will persist over the lifetime.  That having been said, when we forego that 
assumption and instead apply a ―motherhood tax,‖ the costs over a lifetime are far lower 
– in no case more than 2% of GDP in Uganda. The limitations of such an approach is that 
the ―tax‖ is drawn from literature in the United States, a wage market economy where it 
is  expected  that  adolescent  mothers  face  a  decidedly  different  reality  that  those  in 
developing countries. Thus, while we present such an approach to highlight the range of   21 
possibilities, we turn back to our main calculations to get a sense of the magnitude of this 
issue. 
Again, we highlight that these cost estimates are underestimated in the sense that 
we only consider the lost productivity in the labor market, thus not estimating the costs 
incurred to women’s health, the possible implications for the child’s future productivity 
as indicated by studies that show that children of adolescent mothers have lower school 
attainment rates, the social costs of unwed adolescent mothers, and so forth. Also, due to 
data availability, we cannot account mothers under the age of 15 or those who have paid 
the ultimate price of adolescent pregnancy: the girls who die from its complications.  
 
6.   A better path for girls: Conclusions and policy implications 
Social inclusion of adolescent girls that keeps them on a path to achieving their 
maximum human potential will result in significant economic growth. This paper has 
presented simple non-parametric methodologies to roughly quantify the costs incurred by 
societies as a result of the social exclusion of adolescent girls. The estimates are limited 
to the opportunity costs, which measure the losses in terms of potential productivity gains 
and income young girls could have achieved if they were employed, if they had delayed 
pregnancy, or if they had attained higher educational levels.  Using secondary data drawn 
from  the  International  Labour  Organization,  World  Bank,  and  World  Health 
Organization,  we  estimate  the  costs  in  several  African  countries  (Burundi,  Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda) and a few Latin 
American (Brazil and Paraguay), and South Asian (India and Bangladesh) and East Asian 
(China) countries. 
The  rough  estimates  showed  that  marginal  investments  in  girls  can  have  a 
substantial impact on GDP growth and well-being.  If girls just completed one higher 
level of education, the total value of productivity generated over the work life of those 
girls is equivalent to nearly one year’s GDP (Burundi), equivalent to GDP growth that is 
2 percentage points higher in each year that these more educated girls would be working.  
The additional growth would be equivalent to more than 25 percent of annual GDP in the 
other African countries in the sample (except Ethiopia), or an increase in growth rates by 
one to 0.5 percentage points annually.  While girls’ contribution to overall output is much   22 
smaller in the large economies of China and India, the total foregone productivity reaches 
into the billions of dollars.  When adjusting these figures for innate ability bias and labor 
demand elasticities, the point estimates fall by nearly half, but they still show that more 
educated girls would have significant impacts on overall economic growth. 
Girls’  joblessness  imposes  significant  annual  productivity  losses.    If  girls’ 
inactivity activity were the same as that of women, national economies would grow by 
0.8 to 5.4 percentage points annually. However, once accounting for those non-working 
girls who are in school, the costs fall to zero in most of our sample since adult women are 
more inactive than adolescent girls.  And if girls’ and boys’ economic activity rates were 
equal, similar additions to GDP would be observed, while accounting for students only 
slightly reduces the estimates.  Comparing the cost of inactivity to the cost of joblessness, 
the  greatest  gains  are  in  India,  where  the  girl-boy  employment  gap  is  greatest  and, 
compared to other countries with similar gaps, wages are high.   
The lifetime opportunity cost related to adolescent pregnancy – measured by the 
young mother’s foregone annual income over her lifetime – ranges from 1 percent of 
annual GDP in China to 30 percent of annual GDP in Uganda.  Malawi, and Nigeria also 
have  very  high  costs,  equal  to  27%  and  26%,  of  GDP.  Again,  while  the  measured 
impacts are small relative to GDP in China the lost productivity value is quite substantial. 
Assuming a different transmission mechanism – that girls do not abandon school due to 
pregnancy but instead limit their labor supply time and type of work; i.e. the motherhood 
tax – the costs for Uganda, for example, fall to 1% of GDP.
20 
Taken together, the benefits are substantial. For example, i magine that all 1.6 
million adolescent girls in Kenya c ompleted secondary school and that the  220,098 
adolescent mothers were employed instead of falling pregnant so early. The cumulative 
effect could have added US$3.4 billion on the Kenya’s gross income every year.  This is 
equivalent to the entire Kenyan construction sector. 
The costs presented in this paper underestimate the true cost of not investing in 
girls.  The costs computed are only economic ones, and they should be seen as a lower 
bound to the true social costs.  The true costs, which include lower health status of the 
children of these women, lower life expectancy, skill obsolescence of jobless girls, less 
                                                 
20 The full set of estimates are available from the authors, upon request.   23 
social empowerment, and so forth (Cunningham et. al. 2008), would increase the cost 
estimates many-fold. 
Policy  recommendations  to  expand  investments  in  girls  can  be  classified  into 
three general areas:   investing in girls, counting girls, and advocating for girls.
21   
 
Invest in girls 
Increasing funding for adolescent girls and tracking what it achieves
22 will benefit 
both today’s girls and tomorrow’s girls by providing services to today’s girls and learning 
from  those  experiences  to  better  provide  for  girls  tomorrow.    Incentives  for  school 
attendance through conditional cash transfers (Schady and Fiszbein 2009) or scholarships 
(Angrist  et.  al.  2002)  have  been  shown  to  keep  girls  in  school  are  cost  effective 
interventions.    While  the  evidence  of  success  and  cost  effectiveness  in  supply-side 
interventions  is  much  scarcer  than  demand-side  interventions,  governments  could 
consider expanding primary school facilities to house secondary school classes, investing 
in  non-formal  schooling  options  to  reach  the  most  vulnerable  girls,  and  tracking 
enrollment, completion rates, and the percentage of girls at grade for age to measure 
progress (Cunningham et. al. 2008b). 
Girls’  engagement  in  the  labor  market  could  be  enhanced  through  building 
marketable  skills,  facilitating  the  labor  force  entry  process,  and  alleviating  gender 
constraints and expectations.  Skills could be enhanced be improving the relevance of 
educational  curricula,  developing  after-school  tutoring  and  mentoring  programs, 
providing  financial  education  programs,  and  funding  internships,  apprenticeships  and 
training opportunities to promote girls’ transitions to safe and productive livelihoods.  
Teaching job intermediation skills or providing information for the location of jobs may 
facilitate  the  school-to-work  transition.    And  working  with  families,  who  may  make 
decisions on behalf of girls, to value the contribution that girls make to the labor market 
                                                 
21 A recent global movement to support adolescent girls has defined a set of policy recommendations that 
are essential, yet feasible, for governments to implement and for the development community to support. 
The full list of recommendations includes 10 policy actions.  For more information, please see:  
http://www.coalitionforadolescentgirls.org/10_actions.  Only those relevant to the analysis in this paper are 
reported here. 
22 Official Development Assistance figures from 2005-2006 state that 2.17% of total aid ($54.3 billion) list 
gender equality as the principle objective. Assuming the majority of that aid goes to grown women, less 
than two cents per aid dollar is directed to girls.   24 
may facilitate their acceptance for their daughters, wives, mothers, and sisters to engage 
in market work (Cunningham et al 2010). 
To invest in girls’ health, emerging evidence is finding that unconditional cash 
transfers can change girls’ behaviors (mostly by delayed marriage and childbearing, see 
Baird  et  al  2010),  but  supply-side  interventions  may  also  be  effective.    Re-orienting 
health  delivery  systems  to  provide  adolescent  girls  with  services  that  are  accessible, 
customized,  confidential,  and  nonjudgmental  could  provide  girls  with  information  to 
make  good  sexual  health  choices,  better  support  them  to  prevent  unwanted 
circumstances,  and  screen  for  reproductive  and  sexual  health  risks  such  as  domestic 
violence and unintended pregnancy (Cunningham et. al. 2008b). 
 
Count girls 
Providing programs is not sufficient since entry to programs often depends on 
recognition  that  girls  exist.    This  requires  an  effort  by  governments  to  register  all 
newborns and provide birth certificates to ensure access to health services and education 
(Cunningham et al, 2008b).  And once the girls (and boys) are older, it is necessary to 
furnish them with government-issued identification cards so that they may continue to 
access educational opportunities, jobs, and health services.  
To monitor program success, it is necessary to collect data on adolescents and 
disaggregate it by age and gender to assess whether programs are reaching adolescent 
girls.  By tracking program beneficiaries by age, gender, marital status, location, family 
income and school enrollment status in all programs and sectors, program managers and 
governments  can  better  assess  whether  programs  are  reaching  adolescent  girls—
especially the most vulnerable.  Regularly reporting results will increase accountability, 
share learning, target solutions, demonstrate success, and catalyze more resources.   
 
Advocate for girls 
Finally,  governments  could  better  advocate  for  girls  at  two  levels.    First, 
governments could make the law work better for adolescent girls by repealing laws that 
discriminate against girls in the workplace, schools, or family and ensure equality of 
access to health services, education, jobs and earnings, credit, and property ownership.    25 
Second, they could mobilize communities, families, men and boys to support adolescent 
girls.    They  could  sponsor  programs  or  provide  incentives  to  engage  religious  and 
community leaders and head teachers to foster healthier, more supportive communities 
where girls can create and execute their own solutions (Cunningham et. al. 2008b).   
This paper offers a glimpse of what economies are missing when we fail to invest 
in girls. Even by the most conservative estimates, we see that the economic costs are in 
the billions. This, of course, is to say nothing of the massive social and intergenerational 
costs. All told, we can be certain we’re missing out on an awful lot.  The challenge for 
policy makers, development experts, donors, corporations, NGOs working on the ground 
– everyone really – is to intervene before things in a girl’s life go sideways. If we manage 
that, the world will finally realize this tremendous opportunity for change.    26 
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Figure 1: Dropout Rates for Primary and Secondary Education, Girls 
 
 
Source: WB EdStats, derived from the variable ―net enrollment rates‖ at the primary and secondary 
level 
 
Figure 2: Lifetime Cost of Girl Primary and Secondary School Dropout, as % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM, WDI and WB EdStats 
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Figure 3: Youth Female Inactivity Rates 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ computations based on data from ILO and KILM 
 
Figure 4  Difference between the Inactivity Rate of Adolescent Girls and Adult Women 
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Figure 5: Difference between the Youth Female and Youth Male Inactivity Rates (Target 
2), in percentage points  
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM and WDI 
 
 
Figure 6: Cost of Girl Inactivity and Joblessness, if Equal to Adult Female Inactivity or 
Joblessness as % of annual GDP (Target 1) 
 
 
Note: Jobless-lower bound reduces the inactivity rate by gross upper secondary enrolment rates thereby 
dropping students .  Jobless-upper bound reduces the inactivity rate by gross upper secondary and by partial 
net lower secondary thereby dropping students. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM and WDI 
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Figure 7: Cost of Girl Inactivity or Joblessness, relative to Boy’s Inactivity or Joblessness 
Rates, as % of annual GDP (Target 2)  
 
 
Note: Jobless-lower bound reduces the inactivity rate by gross upper secondary enrolment rates thereby 
dropping students .  Jobless-upper bound reduces the inactivity rate by gross upper secondary and by partial 
net lower secondary thereby dropping students.  
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM and WDI 
 




Source: World Bank HNPStats 
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Figure 9: The Lifetime Cost of Adolescent Pregnancy of Current Cohort of 15-19 Year 
Old Girls, as a Share of Annual GDP 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM, WDI, and World Bank HNPStats 
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Table 1: Life time Cost Estimates of Girls Dropping out of Primary and Secondary 
Education  
Country  Life time Cost of early 
school leaving USD 
million 
Cost of early school 
leaving %GDP 
Cost of early school 
leaving % GDP 
developing countries 
adjusted for labor 
elasticity 
Education premium per person 
Primary  Secondary  Primary  Secondary  Primary  Secondary  Percentage increase in 
lifetime earnings, prim 






Burundi  719  1970  24.83%  68.04%  21.96%  46.44%  24%  15% 
China  817  32336  0.01%  0.46%  0.01%  0.44%  21%  21% 
Ethiopia  2090  6803  2.98%  9.70%  2.47%  6.89%  15%  14% 
India  1315  10610  0.04%  0.34%  0.04%  0.34%  27%  26% 
Kenya  11501  27415  19.97%  47.60%  18.85%  41.04%  43%  30% 
Nigeria   34157  40366  10.76%  12.72%  8.18%  8.38%  23%  13% 
Norway   144  399  0.05%  0.14%  -  -  8%  9% 
Senegal  2801  4861  13.54%  23.51%  11.19%  16.77%  24%  15% 
Sweden   570  122  0.17%  0.04%  -  -  9%  9% 
Tanzania  8727  15833  17.86%  32.40%  14.76%  21.75%  24%  15% 
Uganda  3843  9742  13.23%  33.55%  11.7%  22.90%  24%  15% 
UK  705  4041  0.03%  0.19%  -  -  9%  8% 
US   29684  62783  0.21%  0.45%  -  -  8%  9% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM, WDI and WB EdStats 
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Table 2: Cost of Girls Inactivity- Target 1 (youth female inactivity rate = adult female 
inactivity rate), Target 2 (youth female inactivity rate = youth male inactivity rate) 
 
   Inactivity Rates % 
Targets Female 
Inactivity, 000 
Cost, million USD 
PPP  













































































































































Bangladesh  50%  38%  40%  1729  1970   $2,660    $3,030   1.2%  1.3% 
Brazil  57%  38%  43%  2251  3210   $23,521    $33,534   1.2%  1.7% 
Ethiopia  26%  21%  19%  606  404   $646    $431   0.8%  0.6% 
India  78%  42%  65%  14083  39455   $58,941    $165,129   1.6%  4.4% 
Nigeria  83%  62%  51%  4988  3266   $17,917    $11,732   5.4%  3.5% 
Norway  45%  49%  38%  22  -11   $1,199    $ (610)  0.4%  -0.2% 
Paraguay  61%  32%  41%  129  187   $644    $935   2.2%  3.3% 
South Africa  85%  80%  57%  1440  273   $20,032    $3,797   3.9%  0.7% 
Sweden  60%  60%  41%  108  -5   $4,014    $ (203)  1.1%  -0.1% 
United Kingdom  49%  46%  48%  28  92   $1,043    $3,449   0.0%  0.2% 
United States  51%  47%  45%  1307  754   $61,821    $35,685   0.4%  0.3% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM and WDI 
Table 3: Costs Associated with Adolescent Pregnancy 
Country  Total Adolescent 
Births per year 






Total life time 
cost %GDP 
Bangladesh  576,868   $           442,628,523    $                 767   11% 
Brazil   618,114   $       3,527,860,193    $             5,707   10% 
China  525,445   $       1,451,660,440    $             2,763   1% 
Ethiopia  457,482   $           207,975,905    $                 455   15% 
India  3,812,362   $       7,667,428,958    $             2,011   12% 
Kenya  220,098   $           193,850,761    $                 881   17% 
Malawi  106,444   $             57,821,320    $                 543   27% 
Nigeria   994,023   $       1,652,468,504    $             1,662   26% 
Norway  1,297   $             33,976,032    $           26,193   1% 
Paraguay  23,370   $             63,467,790    $             2,716   12% 
Sweden   2,334   $             50,894,510    $           21,804   1% 
Tanzania  300,951   $           179,011,003    $                 595   18% 
Uganda  261,064   $           175,646,582    $                 673   30% 
UK  45,908   $           891,394,152    $           19,417   2% 
US  79,288   $       1,753,020,638    $           22,110   1% 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from ILO KILM, WDI and WB HNPStats   33 
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